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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STEVEN NEIL BREINHOLT, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellee, j 
vs. 
JAN E. BREINHOLT, : 
Defendant and 
Appellant. : 
s APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
: Case No. 940395 - CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final 
judgments entered in domestic cases by the District Courts for the 
State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2), and Rule 3 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON REPLY 
This matter presents two reply issues on appeal. They are as 
follows: 
1. The plaintiff applied the incorrect standard for 
appellate review. 
2. The applicable appellate standard is view for 
correctness. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and case citations are determinative of 
the issues presented in this appeal. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5. 
2. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(4)(a) and (b), (1993). 
3. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(2), (1993). 
4. Crompton v. Crompton, 255 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
5. Haumont v. HaumontP 793 P2d. 421 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
6. Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
7. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
8. Rasband v. Rasband 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a final order and Decree of Divorce 
entered by the Seventh District Court, in and for Carbon County, 
State of Utah, June 14, 1994. The parties were married in 1977 and 
separated in November, 1992. They have two children from this 
union. 
The parties opened a music store in Price, Utah in 1985. This 
was the parties' only source of income from 1985 to 1992. In 1992, 
Mr. Breinholt obtained a second job as the Carbon County 
Commissioner with an annual salary of $21,000. Ms. Jan Breinholt 
worked for two (2) years at minimum wage at a finance company. She 
obtained a better job with a local coal mining company in 1979. 
Her salary was approximately $1,200 per month, gross. She left 
that employment in 1981 to give birth to the parties' first child. 
Ultimately, Mr. Breinholt left his job with a local cement 
company in 1985 to open the family music store. At that time Mr. 
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Breinholt was earning $42,000 per year plus a company car, 
Jan Breinholt also worked in the family music store from 1985 
to late 1988. She discontinued going to the store to give birth to 
the parties second child. Jan did not return to the store or the 
work force thereafter. 
The store was consistently profitable throughout the parties7 
ownership. Profitable enough that the family's assets grew from 
only equity in the home, a $7,000 boat, and $6,700 in savings to 
approximately $360,000. 
The parties ultimately separated in November, 1992. Mr. 
Breinholt filed for divorce in July, 1993, and a trial was held on 
March 7, April 14 and 15, 1994. The primary issues contested 
consisted of child support amounts, alimony, and the valuation of 
the parties7 music store. Much of the dispute centered on the 
personal expenses being paid from the business funds. The focus of 
the personal expenses paid by the business was determinative of the 
three (3) central issues before the trial court. First, the 
valuation of the music store, second, the available money from Mr. 
Breinholt's one full time self-employed job for child support, and 
third, the total available income from all sources to determine 
alimony. 
Course of the Proceedings 
Trial was commenced on March 7, 1994, but discontinued due to 
a family emergency for counsel. The matter was rescheduled for two 
days on April 14 and 15, 1994. 
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Each party testified and presented their respective experts to 
review the expenses paid by the business and determine the value of 
the music store. Each party personally testified regarding their 
respective income and expenses. 
The trial court thereafter took the matter under advisement 
and entered a Memorandum Decision one week later. The trial court 
divided the marital assets totalling in excess of $360,000, set 
alimony and child support awards based upon Mr. Breinholt's job in 
the family store, and determined the family business had a value of 
$100,000. 
The trial court directed plaintiff's counsel to prepare 
Findings of Fact and the Decree of Divorce. The defendant filed 
Objections to the proposed pleadings. The trial court largely 
overruled Jan's request to enter dollar values for the parties7 
return on investment, personal expenses paid from the business, and 
a total of all available income to the parties during the course of 
the marriage. 
Trial Court Disposition 
The lower court thereafter entered the proposed Findings and 
Decree with relative minor interlineation provided by the court. 
The Decree was signed on June 10, 1994, and entered on June 14, 
1994. The defendant then filed her Notice of Appeal on July 8, 
1994. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts are thoroughly set forth in Appellant's 
Brief at pp. 5-11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiff misidentifies the appropriate standard of 
appellate review. The plaintiff's entire rebuttal is premised upon 
this misapplication of the standard for review. Therefore, the 
plaintiff's analysis is fatally flawed. 
The trial court erred by adopting it own "sweat of the brow" 
doctrine and not applying the factors dictated in Jones v. Jones 
700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). In fact, the criteria established by 
Jones id. and Rasband v. Rasband 752 P. 2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
would require remand to the trial court to equitably adjust the 
parties' respective standards of living to more similarly represent 
the standards acquired during the marriage. 
In summary, Mr. Brienholt's discretionary funds from the 
family business permits him a radically higher standard of living 
than that which is left over for Jan and their two children. 
POINT I 
MR. BREINHOLT SUPPLIES THE WRONG STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Mr. Breinholt's rebuttal to the claimed errors of the trial 
court are all hinged upon an erroneous standard for appellate 
review. Mr. Brienholt's arguments are conditioned upon this issue. 
Ms. Jan Brienholt has repeatedly asserted the appropriate 
standard to review is for correctness with no special deference to 
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the trial court. The litigants7 split of opinion on the 
appropriate standard hinges upon what is considered a "finding of 
fact" versus a "conclusion of law". 
Jan has consistently requested the trial court and this court 
to review the totality of the parties' income available to them 
during the course of the marriage. The trial court rejected Jan's 
objections to the Findings and stated, 
3. In setting alimony, the court considered only the 
income that each party may be expected to earn "by the sweat 
of the brow". Since marital assets were divided equally, and 
neither party has substantial non-marital property, investment 
or "unearned" income is presumed to be equal, insubstantial in 
comparison with "earned" income, and excluded from the alimony 
calculations. 
4. Utah Law is clear that the court should consider 
only the income from the equivalent of one full-time job in 
setting child support, Section 78-45-7.5(2), Utah Code (1993). 
This court believes the policy behind that rule applies with 
even greater force in consideration of alimony. [Emphasis 
Added]. 
(See, Appellant's Addendum p.33, [Ruling on Defendant's 
Objections, pp. 2-3]) 
The doctrine of "by the sweat of the brow" is repeated 
verbatim in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as a 
specific finding. 
(See, Appellant's Addendum, p.30, [Findings, f 18]). This policy 
statement by the trial court that child support laws "applies with 
even greater force in consideration of alimony" also appears in the 
Findings of Fact. (See. Appellant's Addendum, p.30, [Findings, f 
19]). 
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Public policy considerations and statutory analysis that 
supports a trial court's decisions are "conclusions," These are 
not facts derived from the evidence submitted to the trial court. 
Therefore, nothing requires special deference to the trial court's 
interpretation of policy or statutory application. 
It is simply illogical to assume a trier of fact, has special 
insight into public policy or statutory interpretation. It is 
appropriate for the trier of fact to have special deference 
regarding credibility, persuasion, and determinations of the 
factual disputes between the litigants. Disputed legal 
interpretation must be initially resolved by the trial court 
however, obtains no special deference on appellate review. 
Such is the status of the case at bar. Jan objected to the 
trial courts application of the child support standards to the 
determinations regarding alimony. (See, Appellant's Addendum p.32, 
[Objections to Findings, fl7(c)]). This is a conclusion of law. 
Although plaintiff was directed to draft the final order, simply 
labeling a conclusion of law as a factual determination does not 
limit appellate review. 
In summary, all of Neil's rebuttal is hinged upon this court 
applying an inappropriate standard of review. Whereas Neil's 
premise is false, his underlying analysis is fatally flawed. 
POINT II 
THE APPLICABLE APPELLATE STANDARD IS VIEW FOR CORRECTNESS. 
As cited in Appellant's Brief, the appropriate standard for 
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reviewing the trial court's conclusions of law are cited in Howell 
v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "Conclusions of 
law, however, are reviewed for correctness and given no special 
deference on appeal. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 
1989); Smith v. Smith. 793, P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)." 
With the appropriate standard in mind, the trial court's 
statements in ff 3 and 4 Ruling on Objections applies two 
inappropriate factors. First, the trial court applied an uncited 
quotation "by the sweat of the brow". This error is more fully 
discussed in Appellant's original brief and will not be repeated 
herein. (See, Appellant's Brief, pp 13-15) 
The second incorrect factor is the exclusion of the "unearned 
income" from consideration in alimony. In Jones v. Jones 700 P.2d 
1072, (Utah 1985) (See, Reply Brief Addendum) the Utah Supreme 
Court specifically stated the ability of the husband to provide 
support to the wife must be considered by the trial court. In that 
case, the parties were married just less than thirty (30) years. 
The husband established a retail pharmacy store and the wife worked 
in minor clerical jobs in the early years of the marriage. Her 
primary occupation during the marriage was raising the children. 
In reviewing the case, the Utah Supreme Court recapped the 
terms of the Divorce Decree. 
Under the terms of the decree, the husband received Riverton 
Drug, including the land, building, and balance sheet assets, 
a condominium he had purchased subsequent to the parties' 
separation, together with its furnishings, a country club 
membership, and all interest in a time-share condominium in 
8 
Mazatlan. The wife received the family home with its 
furnishings, a country club membership, a 1980 automobile, and 
several securities. In addition to the specific items of 
property, the wife was awarded $10,000 in cash, $3,500 in 
attorney fees, and monthly alimony of $1,000 for five years, 
$750 for five additional years, and $500 thereafter. 
700 P. 2d at 1073. 
As in the case at bar, the husband in Jones exclusively 
controlled the finances of the retail business. He elected to pay 
himself $45,000 per year and reinvest the remaining capital in the 
business. The Supreme Court then notes, 
The full profit produced by the business, adjusted by the 
court to take into account legitimate and reasonable needs of 
the business for additional capital, should have been used as 
the basis for assessing the husband's ability to provide for 
his spouse. In making this analysis, the trial court should 
not permit all claims of need for capital on the part of the 
business to take precedence over the support needs of the 
wife. If these capital needs are a result of discretionary 
decisions of the husband to expand and improve the business, 
rather than to maintain it in its present condition, then to 
permit him to divert income into the business at the expense 
of his ex-spouse's support needs would be to permit him to 
enrich himself at her expense. (Emphasis Added) 
700 P. 2d at 1076. 
To fulfil the requirements of Jones, the trial court must 
review unearned income (return on investment) or other similar 
capital resources in determining the payor's ability to provide 
support to his wife. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court improperly 
excluded from consideration unearned income. The trial court 
compounded the error by refusing to consider all the sources of 
capital available to the husband. By failing to consider the 
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factors required in Jones, id. and applying the trial court's newly 
created doctrine "by the sweat of the brow", the trial court 
committed reversible error. 
Had the lower court correctly considered the factors outlined 
in Jones id., the alimony award would have substantially equalized 
the parties's standard of living developed during their marriage. 
In Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) the 
Utah Court of Appeals reiterated the factors established in Jones, 
id. The Court of Appeals stated, 
An alimony award should, to the extent possible, 
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards 
and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones. 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
The Court of Appeals then reviewed the findings available to 
them in Rasband. Again the husband was self-employed while the 
primary pursuit of the wife was a homemaker. The appellate review 
of the findings are also similar to the case at bar and therefore 
the Rasband findings are outlined at length. 
Their assets consisted of the insurance business, a large 
home, vehicles and personal property, all acquired through 
joint efforts. He contributed his income and labor; although 
Mrs. Rasband has average typing skills, she primarily 
contributed her unpaid labor. Her homemaking and child-rearing 
efforts advanced his career pursuits. Both parties are 
functioning adults with health problems not untypical of 
persons nearing fifty years of age. The trial court found that 
Mr. Rasband's net monthly earnings (after business expenses 
but before taxes) were $3,800 and that his needs were $1,500 
per month, "including payment of the family debts." Mrs. 
Rasband's needs were specifically found to be between $1,250 
and $1,400 per month. These findings have not been challenged 
on appeal. 
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The Court of Appeals in Rasbandf id. was critical of the 
similarly vague findings as in the case at bar. The Court of 
Appeals noted, 
The trial court made only one vague, conclusory finding 
regarding Mrs. Rasband's present and future ability to produce 
a sufficient income to meet her needs, i.e., that she is 
"capable of meaningful employment in the future.11 It is this 
finding that apparently formed the basis for the court's 
determination of the amount and the nonpermanence of the 
alimony awarded. However, as the Utah Supreme Court has 
recently pointed out, 
[t]he findings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree "follows logically from, and is 
supported by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P. 2d 
423, 426 (Utah 1986). The findings "should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts 
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
each factual issue was reached." 
752 P.2d at 1334 
The Court of Appeals in Rasband id. then compared the similar 
facts of Jones id. 
Although Mr. Rasband does not have the amount of discretionary 
income Mr. Jones did, the award herein leaves Mr. Rasband with 
some discretionary income and Mrs. Rasband with none. The 
lower court found $45,000 of disposable income. He needs 
$18,000 annually and she needs $16,800, for a total of 
$34,800. This leaves him with $10,000 annual discretionary 
income, in addition to the advantage he enjoys by being able 
to expense some personal living expenses through the business. 
These facts appear to warrant permanent alimony in a monthly 
amount greater than $800. (Emphasis Added) 
Under these circumstances, the amount of nonpermanent, 
declining alimony awarded to Carol Rasband creates a situation 
comparable to the meager award in Higley v. Higley, 676 P.2d 
379 (Utah 1983), and the non-award in Canning v. Canningr 744 
P.2d 325 (Utah App. 1987). When this is coupled with the lack 
of adequate findings regarding her current and future ability 
to produce an income that — together with alimony — will 
meet her monthly need of $1,250-$1,400, the trial court's 
award is a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
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The addendum to Jan's initial brief includes the total tax 
return for the parties in 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. Plaintiff's 
addendum, omits the depreciation deductions from his self-
employment. In fact, from 1990 through 1992, the business took 
depreciation for both parties vehicles and a boat. The boat was 
purchased in 1989 replacing the family boat acquired before he 
became self-employed. The depreciation for these items was $9,179 
in 1991, and $7,225 in 1992. 
Therefore including these family vehicles and recreation 
equipment on Neil's Schedule "C" in 1991 the total business profit 
is over $47,000. In 1992 the total business profit is over $48,000 
when depreciation on the boat and personal vehicles is added back. 
The total monthly award the trial court made to Jan was $461 
for child support, $500 for alimony, $500 of imputed earned income 
when she could go to work "in the next few years" and undescribed 
unearned income of $500. This totals $1,961 for the support of 
herself and two children. 
The standard of living the court awarded Neil was $21,000 from 
his commission job, plus $36,000 from the business employment, plus 
the discretionary personal expenses, such as depreciation of his 
boat. 
As an aside, Mr. Brienholt admits that even during the 
separation, he placed $10,000 in the parties savings account in 
1993 that did not have to be used during that year for any personal 
or business related expenses. (Tr. 316) During the same period he 
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was paying for Jan's auto insurance, health insurance, made IRA 
contributions to each of the retirements in addition to paying 
support. 
The discretionary funds identified in Rasband and Jones, is 
equally analogous to the Breinholt's. Even after paying $13,000 
per year in the current child support and alimony payments, Mr. 
Breinholt has gross income of $43,000 per year. Jan and the two 
children have a standard of living of less than $24,000 per year. 
However, this assumes she will receive $6,000 of wages although she 
is not in the work force. In fact the disparity is $18,000 for Jan 
and $43,000 for Neil. 
In fact, the evidence of Mr. Brienholt's own expert 
established the family business had a cash flow of $60,700. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29). This is in addition to his $21,000 a 
year commission job. Therefore the standards of living for the 
respective parties are inequitably desperate. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff has inappropriately argued from a false premise 
regarding the standard of appellate review. The appropriate 
standard to review the lower court is based upon whether it applied 
the factors outlined in Jones id. or applied its own conclusions 
from other statutes and doctrines. When reviewing the lower 
court's conclusions of law, the Court of Appeals is not required to 
provide any deference to the legal conclusions drawn below. 
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An appropriate application of the law requires the lower 
court's decision be reversed and remanded with instructions to 
consider all the available resources for alimony and equalize the 
parties7 post divorce standards of livinc 
^L. G. CUTLER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, by first class mail, 
postage prepaid on this LJ day of May, 1995, to Ms. Joane Pappas 
White, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee, at 475 East Main Street, 
Price, Utah 84501. 
L. G. CUTLER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
1072 Utah 700 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Because Erickson made no effort at any 
time to procure a buyer for either piece of 
equipment and had approved the sale of the 
shear on the day set forth in the notice for 
less than was eventually obtained, we can-
not find that he was prejudiced by either 
the technical defects in the notice or the 
slight delay in the sale. In fact, since he 
acquiesced to the lower bid, the delay actu-
ally worked to his advantage by lessening 
the deficiency by $2,000. Under these cir-
cumstances, we conclude that the notice 
was reasonable. 
The deficiency judgment entered by the 
lower court against Erickson is therefore 
affirmed. In light of the facts that the 
leases involved in this matter provided for 
an award of attorney fees to Scharf in any 
action necessary to enforce the leases and 
the trial court awarded them to her in 
connection with the proceedings below, we 
remand the case for determination of rea-
sonable fees in connection with this appeal 
as well. Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Associates, .Utah, 617 P.2d 
406, 409 (1980). 
JLALL, CJ., and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
DeMar D. JONES, Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
v. 
Harriet H. JONES, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 18733. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 17, 1985. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Raymond S. Uno, J., entered de-
cree of divorce, divided marital assets, and 
determined alimony. Wife appealed the 
property division and alimony award. The 
Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: 
(1) Supreme Court could not determine 
whether trial court distributed marital as-
sets equitably; (2) trial court abused its 
discretion in fixing monthly alimony award 
to wife at $1,000 for five years, $750 for 
five additional years, and $500 thereafter; 
and (3) how husband chose to allocate prof-
its between himself and his business was 
not binding on court in determining hus-
band's ability to pay alimony. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce ®=*253(4) 
Supreme Court could not determine 
from the record whether trial court equita-
bly distributed property in divorce proceed-
ing and trial court's statement that proper-
ty distribution was "fair and equitable" 
was insufficient finding where trial court 
provided no findings of fact that fixed val-
ues of marital assets. 
2. Divorce <&=>253(4) 
In divorce proceeding, when one of the 
parties to a property distribution raises a 
serious question as to value of one or more 
of the marital assets, trial court's distribu-
tion of those assets should be based upon 
written findings of fact that will permit 
appellate review. 
3. Divorce <3=>286(1) 
Wife waived claim that distribution of 
marital assets was inequitable where wife's 
attorney prepared the inadequate findings 
of fact regarding marital asset values and 
where wife's attorney made no motion to 
have trial court amend the findings to in-
clude values. 
4. Divorce <s=>237 
In fixing a reasonable alimony award, 
court should consider the financial condi-
tions and needs of the wife, the ability of 
the wife to produce a sufficient income for 
herself, and the ability of the husband to 
provide support. 
5. Divorce <©=*240(4) 
Alimony award to wife allowing her 
monthly alimony of $1,000 for five years, 
$750 for five additional years, and $500 
thereafter was insufficient where, other 
than assets awarded to her in property 
distribution, wife had no assets and no 
outside income, where husband and wife 
had formerly enjoyed a very comfortable 
life style, where wife was awarded no in-
come-producing assets, where wife was ob-
ligated to make mortgage payments of 
nearly $700 per month on residence, where 
wife would be unable to maintain anything 
like the standard of living she enjoyed during 
marriage, where wife was 52 years old and 
had no professional training and few market-
able skills, and where husband was in an 
excellent position to provide adequate con-
tinuing support to wife. 
6. Divorce <s=>237 
How husband chose to allocate profit 
from his business between himself and the 
business was not binding on court in de-
termining husband's ability to pay ali-
mony; full profit produced by the business, 
adjusted for legitimate and reasonable 
needs of the business for additional capital, 
should have been used by trial court as 
basis for assessing husband's ability to pro-
vide alimony; trial court should not permit 
claims of need for capital on the part of the 
business to take precedence over support 
needs of wife. 
JONES v. JONES Utah 1073 
Cite as 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) 
The parties were married on December 
13, 1952. They separated during May of 
1980, and their divorce decree was entered 
on June 14, 1982. During the course of the 
marriage, the couple raised four children, 
built a 4,000-square-foot home in Sandy, 
Utah, and established a retail pharmacy 
business, Riverton Drug, which was the 
primary income-producing asset of the mar-
riage. The husband is a licensed pharma-
cist. During the early years of the mar-
riage, the wife worked in minor clerical 
jobs. However, after the family began to 
grow, she worked only intermittently, 
usually at the pharmacy or the associated 
gift shop. Her primary occupation during 
the marriage was raising the children, al-
though she also volunteered considerable 
time to a variety of social service organiza-
tions. 
B.L. Dart, John D. Parken, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant 
Glenn Richman, Salt Lake City plaintiff 
and respondent 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Defendant appeals from the property dis-
tribution and alimony provisions of a de-
cree of divorce, contending that she was 
not given an appropriate share of the mari-
tal assets and that the alimony award is 
insufficient We affirm the property divi-
sion, but reverse the alimony award and 
remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
After a day-long trial, the trial court 
issued a memorandum opinion awarding 
the parties a divorce and describing the 
property to be awarded to each. Shortly 
thereafter, the wife's counsel submitted 
findings of fact, which were approved by 
the trial court. The findings consisted of 
nothing more than statements taken from 
the court's memorandum opinion setting 
out the property division and reciting that 
it was "fair and equitable." Neither the 
memorandum decision nor the findings as-
signed individual values to each of the as-
sets or a total value to the cumulative 
share being awarded to each party. Under 
the terms of the decree, the husband re-
ceived Riverton Drug, including the land, 
building, and balance sheet assets, a condo-
minium he had purchased subsequent to 
the parties' separation, together with its 
furnishings, a country club membership, 
and all interest in a time-share condomin-
ium in Mazatlan. The wife received the 
family home with its furnishings, a country 
club membership, a 1980 automobile, and 
several securities. In addition to the spe-
cific items of property, the wife was award-
ed $10,000 in cash, $3,500 in attorney fees, 
and monthly alimony of $1,000 for five 
years, $750 for five additional years, and 
$500 thereafter. The wife challenges both 
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the property distribution and alimony provi-
sions of the decree. 
In a divorce proceeding, the trial court 
may make such orders concerning property 
distribution and alimony as are equitable. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (1984 ed.). The trial 
court has broad latitude in such matters, 
and orders distributing property and set-
ting alimony will not be lightly disturbed. 
See e.g., Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d 
379, 382 (1983); Dority v. Dority, Utah, 
645 P.2d 56, 59 (1982); English v. English, 
Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (1977). However, 
the trial court must exercise its discretion 
in accordance with the standards that have 
been set by this Court. In the present 
case, we find that the trial court did not 
comply with those standards. We there-
fore reverse and remand, but only as to the 
alimony issue. 
We address first the property distribu-
tion. The wife argues that the trial court 
awarded her such a small portion of the 
marital assets as to make the entire distri-
bution inequitable. Ordinarily, we would 
assess the merit of such an assertion by 
reviewing the trial court's findings of fact 
and the values it assigned to the various 
items of property included in the distribu-
tion. However, in the present case there 
are no findings of fact that fix these val-
ues. In an attempt to compensate for the 
trial court's failure to make such findings, 
we have reviewed the record to determine 
whether the values were apparent from the 
evidence. However, that examination re-
veals that the valuation of the most impor-
tant assets was hotly disputed by the par-
ties. If the trial court accepted one set of 
values, the wife was clearly awarded too 
little; if another set was adopted, it is 
possible that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion. 
[1,2] On the present record, we cannot 
determine whether the trial court distribut-
ed the property equitably. In re Marriage 
of Martin, 22 Wash.App. 295, 588 P.2d 
1235, 1236 (1979). To avoid problems of 
this nature, we require that when one of 
the parties to a property distribution raises 
a serious question as to the value of one or 
more of the assets, the trial court's distri-
bution of those assets should be based 
upon written findings of fact that will per-
mit appellate review. Cf. Chandler v. 
West, Utah, 610 P.2d 1299,1301 (1980). 
Counsel for the wife contends that the 
matter should be remanded to the trial 
court for entry of the required findings. 
The husband contends that such a remand 
is unnecessary. He relies on Pearson v. 
Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080 (1977), for 
the proposition that the trial court need 
only make generalized findings of fact to 
support its judgment and that the trial 
court's statement that the distribution was 
"fair and equitable" is a sufficient finding 
to sustain the judgment. 
The husband misreads Pearson. There 
the court entered a decree dividing the 
marital property pursuant to a general for-
mula stipulated to by the parties. Appel-
lant asserted that the court failed to make 
detailed findings of fact showing that the 
distribution was in accord with the stipula-
tion. We held that the discretion conferred 
on the trial court by section 30-3-5 of the 
Code could not be controlled by a stipula-
tion of the parties and that the trial court's 
general and rather conclusory findings of 
fact were sufficient to support the property 
distribution. Id. at 1082. However, we 
specifically observed that the Pearson ap-
pellant did not claim that the ultimate dis-
tribution was inequitable. That fact was 
critical to the affirmance. In contrast, the 
gravamen of the wife's claim here is that 
the distribution was inequitable. To deter-
mine whether equity was done, we must 
have before us specific findings on the 
facts pertinent to that issue. 
[3] Normally, we would grant the reme-
dy sought by the wife and remand for 
findings on the specific value of the assets. 
In this case, however, the wife's attorney 
prepared the inadequate findings of fact 
she challenges on appeal and the conclu-
sions of law and decree of divorce, all of 
which the court entered without alteration. 
Counsel for the wife made no motion to 
have the trial court amend the findings to 
include values. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(b). 
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The wife cannot come now, albeit through 
new counsel, and complain of her own fail-
ure to include specific property values in 
the findings of fact. She has waived the 
claim. 
The wife's second claim is that the trial 
court abused its discretion in making the 
alimony award, considering both the length 
of the marriage and the present financial 
resources of the parties. We agree. 
[4,5] This Court has described the pur-
pose of alimony: "[T]he m o s t important 
function of alimony is to provide support 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during mar-
riage, and to prevent the wife from becom-
eral securities of relatively small value and 
limited liquidity. She now must make 
mortgage payments of nearly $700 per 
month on the residence, wholly apart from 
ordinary and necessary expenses of food, 
clothing, and transportation. Assuming 
that she sells the house and uses the equity 
to purchase more modest accommodations, 
it is almost certain that she will be unable 
to maintain anything even approaching the 
standard of living she enjoyed during the 
marriage, given the $1,000 per month ali-
mony awarded by the trial court for the 
first five years and the decreased amounts 
awarded for the following years. 
The second factor to be considered is the 
ing a public charge." English v. English,/ wife's ability to produce a sufficient income 
565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in 
mind, the Court in English articulated 
three factors that must be considered in 
fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of 
the wife; 
[2] the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
[3] the ability of the husband to provide 
support 
Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted). See also 
Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 144, 
147 (1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 
P.2d 1218, 1223 (1980). Nowhere in the 
trial court's memorandum decision, its find-
ings of fact, or its statements made on the 
record at the conclusion of the hearing is 
there any indication that the court analyzed 
the circumstances of the parties jn light of 
these three factors. And our attempt to 
perform this analysis through a review of 
the record evidence compels us to conclude 
that the trial court abused its discretion in 
fixing the alimony award. 
As noted, the first factor to be con-
sidered is the financial condition and needs 
of the wife. Other than the assets award-
ed her in the property distribution, the wife 
has no assets and no outside income. As a 
result of the success of Riverton Drug, the 
couple had enjoyed a very comfortable life-
style. Jn the property settlement, the wife 
was awarded no income-producing assets. 
She was awarded $10,000 in cash and sev-
for herself. She was married at the age of 
23 and was 52 years old at the time of trial. 
The paid work she did in the early years of 
the marriage and the miscellaneous func-
tions she performed at the pharmacy and 
gift shop were all relatively unskilled in 
nature. During most of the marriage, with 
the full consent and support of her hus-
band, she devoted her time to raising their 
four children and donating her services to 
various social service organizations. She 
has no professional training and few mar-
ketable skills. The husband managed the 
finances of both the family and the busi-
ness and provided his wife with an allow-
ance to cover her expenses. When River-
ton Drug was finally incorporated, the 
stock was issued entirely in the husband's 
name. The wife has no independent in-
come. It is entirely unrealistic to assume 
that a woman in her mid-50's with no sub-
stantial work experience or training will be 
able to enter the job market and support 
herself in anything even resembling the 
style in which the couple had been living. 
See Higley v. Higley, Utah, 676 P.2d 379, 
381 (1983). 
The final factor to be considered is the 
ability of the husband to provide support to 
the wife. The record shows that although 
the husband paid himself an annual $45,000 
from the proceeds of Riverton Drug, the 
total profits from the business actually 
amounted to almost $90,000 per year. 
1076 Utah 700 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
While the trial court apparently viewed 
$45,000 as the husband's total annual in-
come for purposes of determining alimony, 
in fact he had control over the entire profit, 
but chose to take only half of it as personal 
income and to set the rest aside for rein-
vestment in the business. 
[6] The apportionment of income be-
tween personal and business uses is quite 
properly a matter left to the discretion of 
the husband as owner of the pharmacy and 
gift shop. However, how he chooses to 
allocate that profit is not binding on the 
court in determining his ability to pay ali-
mony to his ex-spouse. The full profit pro-
duced by the business, adjusted by the 
court to take into account legitimate and 
reasonable needs of the business for addi-
tional capital, should have been used as the 
basis for assessing the husband's ability to 
provide for his spouse. In making this 
analysis, the trial court should not permit 
all claims of need for capital on the part of 
the business to take precedence over the 
support needs of the wife. If these capital 
needs are a result of discretionary deci-
sions of the husband to expand and im-
prove the business, rather than to maintain 
it in its present condition, then to permit 
him to divert income into the business at 
the expense of his ex-spouse's support 
needs would be to permit him to enrich 
himself at her expense. Cf. Christiansen 
v. Christiansen, Utah, 667 P.2d 592, 594 
(1983). 
On the record, there is no reason to 
surmise that the income generated by the 
business will decrease in the future. The 
husband, therefore, as sole owner, is in an 
excellent position to provide adequate con-
tinuing support to his ex-spouse. 
The foregoing analysis leads inexorably 
to the conclusion that the trial court's ali-
mony award was inequitable, both in terms 
of the initial amount and the graduated 
diminution over time. The wife is in her 
mid-50's, possesses few marketable job 
skills, and has little hope of retraining. 
This is simply not the sort of situation in 
which a decreasing rehabilitative alimony 
award is appropriate. The husband oper-
ates a financially successful business, built 
up over the course of the marriage through 
the joint efforts of both the husband and 
the wife. These facts clearly call for some 
form of continuing spousal maintenance. 
The original award must be more substan-
tial, considering the husband's real discre-
tionary income, and should continue at that 
level for the foreseeable future. 
We remand for further findings consist-
ent with this opinion. The trial court, of 
course, will retain continuing jurisdiction 
over the matter and may modify the decree 
on petition of a complaining ex-spouse if 
the circumstances should change in the fu-
ture. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5 (Supp.1983). 
HALL, C J., and STEWART, HOWE, and 
DURHAM, JJ. concur. 
STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF 
CLATTERBUCK, Nick Alan. 
No. 19937. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 18, 1985. 
Juvenile charged with criminal homi-
cide and first-degree murder was certified 
by the Third Juvenile District Court, Utah 
County, Leslie D. Brown, J., for trial as an 
adult. The 15-year-old juvenile appealed 
certification order. The Supremje Court, 
Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) statute em-
powering juvenile court to certify juvenile 
for trial as an adult provides a substantive 
standard for certification; (2) even though 
statute empowering juvenile court to certi-
fy juvenile for trial as adult does not speci-
fy burden of proof that State must meet to 
justify certification, statute does not violate 
due process; (3) juvenile court's failure to 
expressly state standard of proof that 
